Working paper · How Price-Aware Are AI Pricing Agents? Rival Price Cuts, Legal Price Rules and False Punishment Signals Martin Kaiser · Apart Research AI Collusion Sprint

Interactive demo, synthetic market

When the rule looks like retaliation

The question
Can a legal price rule, like a platform's offer hold or Germany's noon rule for fuel, make an honest AI pricing agent look like it punishes rivals who cut prices?
The finding
Yes. A 3-period hold made Qwen3-235B look like it retaliates: 0.159 of the Nash-to-monopoly gap. Only 0.066 came from the hold itself. The other 0.093 came from the AI, which learned from its held-down price and kept proposing low prices.
The method
Fork the market just before the AI sees the rival's cut, run the copy with and without the rule, and replay the AI's own choices through the rule. The replay splits what the rule did from what the AI did.

Try it below: pick an agent, switch on a rule, and compare what a price-only auditor and an execution-aware auditor conclude.

1Pricing agent

2Execution rule

3Rival

Worked cases

Fig. 1

Prices around the shock

Data table

The two auditors' rulings

Fig. 2

Persistence of the response

R = mean gap to the no-shock path over periods 2–5, divided by G = 15.75 (the monopoly–Nash price gap). The shaded band is that window.

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